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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 
a parent of a child with a disability can bring administrative 
and judicial proceedings to challenge a school district’s 
alleged violations of the Act, and, if the parent emerges as “a 
prevailing party,” the parent is then eligible for an award of 
attorneys’ fees.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).  This case 
presents the question whether a fee award is available to 
parents who, after unsuccessfully challenging a school 
district’s proposed educational placement for their child, later 
obtain a court order requiring the school district to reimburse 
them for the costs of the child’s “stay put” placement—the 
“then-current educational placement” in which the Act 
permitted the child to remain while administrative and 
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judicial proceedings were pending.  Id. § 1415(j).  We answer 
this question in the affirmative and conclude, consistent with 
the Act’s text and with the opinions of this Court and the 
other Courts of Appeals, that a court-ordered award of 
retrospective and compensatory relief, even if awarded under 
the Act’s “stay put” provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), confers 
“prevailing party” status.  We therefore will reverse the 
District Court’s denial of attorneys’ fees and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I. Background 
This case pertains to a long-running dispute between 
Appellants, the parents of E.R., and Appellee, the Ridley 
School District, concerning E.R.’s schooling and Ridley’s 
obligations under the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482.  Before turning to 
the details of that dispute, we briefly review the statutory 
framework from which it arose. 
A. Statutory Context 
The IDEA is a comprehensive statutory scheme 
enacted “to ensure that all children with disabilities have 
available to them a free appropriate public education.”  
20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).  To that end, the Act allocates 
federal dollars to assist the states’ educational services for 
children with disabilities.  Id. § 1411(a)(1).  In return, 
recipient states must provide a “free appropriate public 
education” to children with disabilities residing in their states, 
an “individualized education program” (“IEP”) for each child 
with a disability, and specified procedural safeguards for 
children with disabilities and their parents.  Id. § 1412(a)(1), 
(4), (6). 
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One consequence of the IDEA’s requirements is that 
school districts must sometimes reimburse parents of children 
with disabilities for educational expenses made on their 
children’s behalf.  Specifically, because an IEP must account 
for a child’s “strengths,” the parents’ “concerns” about the 
child’s education, the child’s most recent disability 
evaluation, and the child’s “academic, developmental, and 
functional needs,” id. § 1414(d)(3)(A), an IEP that meets the 
Act’s requirements may require the child to be placed in a 
private school.  If so, the IDEA obliges the school district, in 
providing the child with a “free appropriate public 
education,” to reimburse the parents for the child’s  
private-school tuition and related expenses.  See Sch. Comm. 
v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 363, 369-70 (1985); see also 
20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(10)(B), 1415(i)(2)(C). 
This reimbursement obligation exists not only when 
the school district and the parents agree that the child should 
be in private school but also sometimes when they do not.  
See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C).  For example, even 
when parents place a child in a private-school setting to 
which the school district will not consent, the school district 
remains liable for the private-school costs if an adjudicator 
later determines that the private school was the appropriate 
educational placement for the child.  See Sch. Comm., 471 
U.S. at 372-74.  And even if, on appeal, a court were 
ultimately to determine that the private school was not the 
appropriate educational placement, the child is entitled to 
“stay put” in the “then-current [private] educational 
placement” during the pendency of the appeal.  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(j).  In that circumstance, as long as the child is 
twenty-one years of age or younger, see 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412(a)(1)(A); Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 
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480 F.3d 259, 272 (3d Cir. 2007), the school district must 
continue reimbursing the child’s parents until the point, if 
ever, that the “proceedings,” including on appeal, resolve in 
the school district’s favor, M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist. 
(Ridley IV), 744 F.3d 112, 117-19, 124-28 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j)). 
School districts have one more economic reason to 
adhere to the Act’s requirements: although under the 
“American Rule” parties typically pay their own attorneys’ 
fees, district courts can order school districts that lose IDEA 
disputes to pay “reasonable attorneys’ fees” to “a prevailing 
party who is the parent of a child with a disability.”  
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B); P.N. ex rel. M.W. v. Clementon 
Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 2006).  The scope of 
school districts’ potential liability for fee awards is the subject 
of this appeal, the facts of which we recount below. 
B. Factual and Procedural Background 
1. IEP Litigation 
E.R. attended an elementary school in the Ridley 
School District for kindergarten and first grade.  Ridley 
School District v. M.R. (Ridley II), 680 F.3d 260, 264 (3d Cir. 
2012).  After identifying E.R.’s learning disabilities during 
her first-grade year, Ridley and E.R.’s parents agreed to an 
IEP for the remaining months of that academic year.  Id. at 
265-66.  The parties’ IEP negotiations for second grade, 
however, were unsuccessful because they disagreed about 
what reading aids would be appropriate for E.R., so E.R.’s 
parents opted to enroll her in a private school and to file an 
administrative complaint accusing Ridley of “fail[ing] to 
develop an appropriate IEP.”  Id. at 267-77. 
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The administrative hearing officer agreed with E.R.’s 
parents and, in a report dated April 21, 2009, opined that 
Ridley’s proposed IEPs “were inadequate and therefore 
denied E.R. a free appropriate public education.”  Id. at 267 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  This decision in the 
parents’ favor during the administrative review process 
equated to “an agreement between the State and the parents” 
and rendered E.R.’s private-school placement her  
“then-current educational placement” for purposes of the 
IDEA’s “stay put” provision.  Ridley IV, 744 F.3d at 119 
(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j)).  Beginning at that point, 
therefore, Ridley was obliged to reimburse E.R.’s parents for 
their private-school costs.  See id. 
But the administrative ruling in E.R.’s parents’ favor 
did not fare well in the District Court or on appeal to this 
Court.  After Ridley petitioned for review of the 
administrative hearing officer’s decision, the District Court 
rejected the parents’ contention that the challenged IEPs were 
“not based on peer-reviewed research” and were therefore 
deficient, Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R. (Ridley I), No. 09-2503, 
2011 WL 499966, at *12-15 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2011), and we 
affirmed, explaining that “although schools should strive to 
base a student’s specially designed instruction on  
peer-reviewed research to the maximum extent possible, the 
student’s IEP team retains flexibility to devise an appropriate 
program, in light of the available research,” Ridley II, 680 
F.3d at 275-79. 
2. Reimbursement Litigation 
E.R.’s parents did not pursue their IEP-related claims 
further, but they did ask Ridley to reimburse them for their 
private-school expenses between the administrative hearing 
7 
 
officer’s decision in 2009 and the conclusion of the IEP 
appeal in this Court in 2012.  See Ridley IV, 744 F.3d at  
116-17.  When Ridley declined, E.R.’s parents filed suit in 
the District Court under the IDEA’s “stay put” provision, 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), seeking “to have the cost of [E.R.’s] 
placement paid through final resolution of the dispute over 
her educational placement,” App. 23. 
This time, the District Court ruled in the parents’ 
favor.  See M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist. (Ridley III), No. 11-2235, 
2012 WL 3279230, at *5-13 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2012).  
Although Ridley asserted a trio of defenses—claim 
preclusion, the parents’ alleged failure to bring a compulsory 
counterclaim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) in 
their first suit, and the IDEA’s ninety-day statute of 
limitations—the District Court rejected each of them, 
concluding that Ridley’s reimbursement obligations began 
once the hearing officer issued her decision in E.R.’s parents’ 
favor and continued through the completion of the appeals 
process.  See id. 
On appeal, we affirmed the District Court’s decision 
on the reimbursement issue in full.  See Ridley IV, 744 F.3d at 
120-28.  Ridley then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ 
of certiorari, which was denied on May 18, 2015.  See Ridley 
School District v. M.R., 135 S. Ct. 2309 (2015).  Only after 
that denial did Ridley reimburse E.R.’s parents as the District 
Court had ordered in 2012.   
3. Attorneys’ Fees Motion 
Having finally obtained the reimbursement they 
sought, E.R.’s parents filed a motion for an award of 
attorneys’ fees under the IDEA’s attorneys’ fees provision, 
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20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i), but the District Court denied the 
motion, holding that reimbursement for the costs of E.R.’s 
temporary “stay put” placement was only “interim” relief and 
thus E.R.’s parents were not “prevailing parties,” App. 10-11.  
This appeal followed. 
II. Standard of Review1 
Although ordinarily we review attorneys’ fees rulings 
for abuse of discretion, our review is plenary where, as here, 
the district court based its denial on legal conclusions.  Raab 
v. City of Ocean City, 833 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2016).  That 
is, the District Court here did not deny fees on the ground 
that, even if E.R.’s parents were “prevailing part[ies]” under 
§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i), their success was de minimis; if it had, 
then our review would be for abuse of discretion.  See Farrar 
v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114-16 (1992); id. at 119 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring).  Instead, the District Court determined, as a 
threshold matter, that E.R.’s parents were not “prevailing 
part[ies],” so the District Court lacked discretion to award any 
fees.  Its determination on the “prevailing party” issue is a 
legal conclusion over which our review is plenary.  See D.F. 
v. Collingswood Borough Bd. of Educ., 694 F.3d 488, 495 (3d 
Cir. 2012). 
III. Discussion 
Applying this standard of review, we conclude, 
contrary to the District Court’s decision, that E.R.’s parents in 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A).  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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fact are “prevailing part[ies]” under § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i) and 
thus are eligible for a fee award.  To provide context for the 
reasons behind our conclusion, we first retrace the District 
Court’s analysis. 
The IDEA attorneys’ fee provision, like various other 
statutory fee-shifting provisions, allows courts to award 
attorneys’ fees to a “prevailing party.”  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i).2  Because statutory language is generally 
interpreted in the same way as its “functional equivalent” in a 
similar context in the United States Code, Gomez-Perez v. 
Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 481 (2008), we interpret this fee 
provision consistently with other federal statutes using the 
term “prevailing party,” see Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, 
Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 
603 n.4 (2001).  Thus, to “prevail” under the IDEA, as under 
other statutes with “prevailing party” fee provisions, a party 
must obtain a “material alteration of the legal relationship of 
the parties” that is “judicially sanctioned.”  Raab, 833 F.3d at 
292 (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604-05).  Importantly, 
a party achieves a “material alteration” of the parties’ legal 
relationship and “prevail[s]” for attorneys’ fees purposes only 
if he obtains relief that is “in some way merit[s]-based.”  Id. 
at 293.  Fee-shifting under a “prevailing party” statute is not 
appropriate, for example, when a plaintiff wins a preliminary 
injunction with respect to a particular request for relief but 
                                              
2 See also, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (certain civil 
rights statutes); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964); 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (Fair Housing 
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (Americans with Disabilities Act); 
52 U.S.C. § 10310(e) (Voting Rights Act of 1965). 
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then loses on the merits of that request for relief.  See Sole v. 
Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 86 (2007).   
In the IDEA context, our opinions in John T. ex rel. 
Paul T. v. Delaware County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545 
(3d Cir. 2003), and J.O. ex rel. C.O. v. Orange Township 
Board of Education, 287 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2002), have 
applied the requirement of merits-based relief to three 
forward-looking injunctive orders: an order requiring a 
child’s temporary reinstatement to public school after the 
school district had requested home-schooling, J.O., 287 F.3d 
at 269-70, a preliminary injunction to preserve supplemental 
services previously provided by a school district, John T., 318 
F.3d at 549-50, and a contempt order aimed at ensuring the 
school district’s compliance with the preliminary injunction, 
id. at 551, 554.  We held in John T. and J.O. that all three 
orders relating to temporary and preliminary relief were not 
merits-based and thus could not confer “prevailing party” 
status under § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i).  See John T., 318 F.3d at  
558-60; J.O., 287 F.3d at 273-74.3 
                                              
3 We acknowledge that our conclusion with respect to 
the preliminary orders in J.O. and John T. exists in tension 
with the fact that, when a preliminary injunction pertains to a 
child’s education, the injunction awards schooling or 
supplemental services that cannot be nullified, even if an 
adjudicator ultimately holds that those educational services 
were not required under the IDEA.  See generally N.D. v. 
Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 600 F.3d 1104, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(implying, because the temporary denial of educational 
services can create irreparable harm, that even interim 
educational services can create lasting benefits);  
Nieves-Márquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 122 (1st Cir. 
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In its diligent attempt to follow our opinions in John T. 
and J.O., the District Court here wrote a thoughtful and 
thorough opinion, denying attorneys’ fees because, in 
comparing the orders in John T. and J.O. to the 
reimbursement award here, the District Court reasoned that 
the reimbursement award was a form of temporary “stay put” 
relief and that, under John T. and J.O., such “interim” relief 
could not confer “prevailing party” status.  App. 10-11.  
Although we disagree with that analysis, we acknowledge the 
novelty of the fee motion before the District Court: John T. 
and J.O. addressed forward-looking and injunctive IDEA 
“stay put” relief, but we have never before addressed 
eligibility for fees in a case where a party received backward-
looking and compensatory relief arising from the IDEA’s 
“stay put” provision. 
We hold today that such relief is merits-based and 
confers “prevailing party” status.  In so doing, we draw 
support, first, from the IDEA’s text; second, from our case 
law; and third, from the persuasive precedent in other 
Circuits. 
                                                                                                     
2003) (same).  Indeed, a claim for such preliminary and 
injunctive educational relief could be viewed as having its 
own merits, independent of a dispute over a child’s IEP or 
educational placement.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).  But J.O. 
and John T. constrain us to consider preliminary injunctions 
in the education context no differently from those outside of 
the education context, and we therefore will ignore any 
distinctions between educational and non-educational 
preliminary injunctions in our discussion below. 
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A. Statutory Text 
1. “Prevailing Party” 
We begin with the IDEA’s text.  Kingdomware Techs., 
Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1976 (2016).  
Borrowing from the “prevailing party” fee provision 
applicable to suits brought under various federal civil rights 
statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the IDEA’s attorneys’ fees 
provision states that a district court, “in its discretion, may 
award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs . . . to a 
prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.”  
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i).4  For that reason, we interpret 
the language of § 1988 and the IDEA attorneys’ fees 
provision in “the same way,” In re Cmty. Bank, 418 F.3d 277, 
295-96 (3d Cir. 2005), and are bound by our cases addressing 
§ 1988—two of which counsel in favor of holding that E.R.’s 
parents received merits-based relief that conferred “prevailing 
party” status.  We discuss those two cases below. 
First, in Bagby v. Beal, we held that, because the 
plaintiff was afforded a due process hearing, she was the 
“prevailing party” under § 1988 with respect to her 42 U.S.C. 
                                              
4 The text of the IDEA attorneys’ fees provision itself, 
by tracking § 1988 nearly verbatim, makes clear that it is 
premised on § 1988.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i); cf. 
42 U.S.C. § 1988.  The legislative history reinforces that 
conclusion, as a conference report on the IDEA’s “prevailing 
party” fees provision expressly references Marek v. Chesny, 
473 U.S. 1 (1985), a Supreme Court case interpreting § 1988.  
See H.R. Rep. No. 99-687, at 5 (1986) (Conf. Rep.); see also 
Marek, 473 U.S. at 7-18. 
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§ 1983 procedural due process claim, even if she did not 
ultimately prevail at the due process hearing.  606 F.2d 411, 
414-15 (3d Cir. 1979).  We reasoned that the hearing’s 
outcome meant only that the plaintiff did not succeed on her 
underlying substantive due process claim, even though the 
fact of the hearing meant that she had prevailed on her 
procedural due process claim.  See id. 
So too here.  Even though E.R.’s parents did not 
succeed with respect to their request for a permanent private 
school placement, see Ridley II, 680 F.3d at 273-79, they did 
prevail with respect to their procedural right to 
reimbursement under the IDEA’s “stay put” provision, 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(j).  See Ridley IV, 744 F.3d at 117-19.  Indeed, 
§ 1415 has the heading “procedural safeguards,” and section 
headings are “tools available for the resolution of a doubt 
about the meaning of a statute.”  Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. 
Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47 (2008) (quoting 
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 528 (2002)).  Bagby thus 
counsels in favor of deeming E.R.’s parents’ procedural 
success a victory “on the merits” that conferred “prevailing 
party” status.  Bagby, 606 F.2d at 415. 
Second, in People Against Police Violence v. City of 
Pittsburgh, we held that the plaintiffs were “prevailing 
parties” under § 1988 by virtue of an injunction that had 
permanently prevented the defending city from enforcing an 
unconstitutional ordinance; had granted the plaintiffs “what 
they sought on an enduring basis”; and had been a temporary 
or “preliminary” injunction only in the sense that it did not 
apply to the city’s later-revised ordinance, which had 
remedied the preexisting constitutional defects.  520 F.3d 
226, 228-30, 232-36 (3d Cir. 2008).  Given that the district 
court’s analysis of claims and defenses with respect to the 
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unconstitutional first ordinance was independent of its 
analysis with respect to the revised ordinance, we held that 
the injunction afforded the plaintiffs “lasting relief on the 
merits of their claims,” id. at 229-30, 234, providing “an 
example of that rare situation where a merits-based 
determination is made at the injunction stage,” Singer Mgmt. 
Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 650 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 
2011) (en banc). 
Here, likewise, the particular claims and defenses 
about E.R.’s educational placement, which the parties had 
litigated in the IEP action, were independent of the claims and 
defenses about Ridley’s “stay put” obligations, which the 
parties litigated in the reimbursement action.  Compare Ridley 
IV, 744 F.3d at 120-28, with Ridley II, 680 F.3d at 267-83.  
Because the presence of independent claims and defenses 
signals the presence of independent merits, see People 
Against Police Violence, 520 F.3d at 229-30, 234; see also 
Sch. Dist. v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd. (In re Sch. 
Asbestos Litig.), 842 F.2d 671, 678 (3d Cir. 1988), our 
reasoning in People Against Police Violence, like our 
decision in Bagby, favors the view that the reimbursement 
obtained here, arising from claims and defenses that were 
independent of those relating to E.R.’s IEP, conferred 
“prevailing party” status to E.R.’s parents. 
Read together, Bagby and People Against Police 
Violence support an interpretation of “prevailing party” under 
42 U.S.C. § 1988 that allows permanent procedural relief, 
when the plaintiff has obtained it through an independent 
merits determination, to confer “prevailing party” status.  
Today we import that analysis into the IDEA context, where, 
as we explain below, the IDEA’s statutory context and 
“overall object” provide additional support for holding that 
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E.R.’s parents are prevailing parties.  Long v. Tommy Hilfiger 
U.S.A., Inc., 671 F.3d 371, 375 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Disabled in Action of Pa. v. SEPTA, 539 F.3d 199, 210 (3d 
Cir. 2008)). 
2. Statutory Context 
We read statutory provisions in context, see King v. 
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015), and must consider any 
legislative findings that would “enable us to evaluate 
[Congress’s] legislative judgment,” United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995).  Here, Congress expressly 
found that “[i]mproving educational results for children with 
disabilities is an essential element of our national policy of 
ensuring equality of opportunity . . . for individuals with 
disabilities,” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1), and thus the statute 
seeks to make “the education of children with disabilities . . . 
more effective,” to “ensure that all children with disabilities 
have available to them a free appropriate public education . . . 
designed to meet their unique needs,” and to “ensure that the 
rights of children with disabilities and parents of such 
children are protected,” id. § 1400(c)(5), (d)(1)(A), (d)(1)(B).  
Along these lines, the IDEA’s legislative history reflects that 
Congress enacted the attorneys’ fees provision specifically to 
ensure “that due process procedures, including the right to 
litigation if that [becomes] necessary, [are] available to all 
parents.”  S. Rep. No. 99-112, at 2 (1985). 
These child- and parent-friendly goals are not a reason 
for us to interpret “prevailing party” under the IDEA any 
differently than we would under other statutes, Buckhannon, 
532 U.S. at 610; John T., 318 F.3d at 558, but, in considering 
the statutory context, we must consider the practical 
consequences of withholding attorneys’ fees in cases like this 
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one, see Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1070 (2016); 
Long, 671 F.3d at 375.  After all, courts are “decidedly 
receptive” to remedies that are “necessary or at least helpful 
to the accomplishment of the statutory purpose.”  Cannon v. 
Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979). 
We accordingly reject Ridley’s contention that any and 
all relief relating to the IDEA’s “stay put” provision simply 
cannot confer “prevailing party” status.  Ridley’s position, if 
made law, would render it impossible in many cases for 
parents, who ordinarily cannot afford private counsel, to 
enforce their “stay put” rights.  See generally Kay v. Ehrler, 
499 U.S. 432, 436 & n.8 (1991); Newman v. Piggie Park 
Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).  While we are 
confident the vast majority of school districts view their 
mission as collaborative, not adversarial, with parents in their 
joint endeavor to provide children with meaningful 
educational opportunities and appropriate support, we cannot 
ignore the reality of occasional lapses.  Nor can we allow 
school districts that ignore their obligations under the IDEA’s 
“stay put” provision to do so with impunity—a result that is 
the antithesis of the IDEA’s goals.  See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d), 
1415(f)-(j). 
The IDEA’s statutory scheme accords far better with 
an attorneys’ fee regime that allows parents to take effective 
legal action if necessary to enforce their “stay put” rights.  
Granted, fees are not available when parents seek a  
forward-looking “stay put” injunction, see John T., 318 F.3d 
at 558-60; J.O., 287 F.3d at 273-74, but such injunctive relief 
is often litigated as part and parcel of the underlying 
proceedings about the child’s IEP or educational placement, 
see, e.g., John T., 318 F.3d at 549-51, with a commensurate 
reduction in the time and burden of litigation.  By contrast, 
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when a school district violates its “stay put” obligations and 
parents must take action—whether by motion or by separate 
complaint—to obtain retrospective compensatory relief, then, 
for all practical purposes, the resulting proceedings are 
separate from any IEP or educational placement proceedings. 
Our customary interpretation of the term “prevailing 
party” and the statutory context of the fee provision at issue 
compel us to consider not only the course charted by our prior 
opinions, but also the real consequences of withholding 
attorneys’ fees when parents obtain retrospective 
compensatory relief arising from the IDEA’s “stay put” 
provision.  In situations like these, we conclude that the 
parents are “prevailing part[ies]” eligible for an award of 
attorneys’ fees under § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i). 
B. Third Circuit Cases 
Our previous opinions in the IDEA context buttress 
our conclusion in this case.  In P.N. ex rel. M.W. v. Clementon 
Board of Education, for instance, we held that an award 
reimbursing parents for the costs of supplemental services 
conferred “prevailing party” status under the IDEA.  See 442 
F.3d at 850-51, 856-57.  Likewise, after affirming the parents’ 
right to reimbursement for the costs of a child’s “stay put” 
placement in Drinker ex rel. Drinker v. Colonial School 
District, we stated that the parents were “entitled to renew 
their motion for attorneys’ fees” on remand, thereby 
confirming that the parents were prevailing parties.  78 F.3d 
859, 863-68 (3d Cir. 1996).  Even when discussing 
reimbursement related to a temporary “stay put” educational 
placement, thus, our prior opinions establish that retrospective 
and compensatory relief can ground a fee award. 
18 
 
Ridley, however, points to isolated phrases in John T. 
and J.O. and contends they oblige us to hold that relief arising 
from the IDEA’s “stay put” provision can never confer 
“prevailing party” status.  Not so.  The school district ignores 
the procedural postures of those cases, which, as discussed 
above, involved forward-looking and temporary injunctive 
relief, not backward-looking and compensatory relief that 
requires an independent merits determination.  See John T., 
318 F.3d at 549-51, 558-60 (preliminary injunction); J.O., 
287 F.3d at 269-70, 273-74 (order granting temporary 
reinstatement to public school). 
To be sure, the contempt order in John T. awarded 
John T.’s parents $1100 as a rough estimate of the value of 
services that the school district, in violating the district 
court’s preliminary injunction, had refused to provide for a 
particular month.  John T., 318 F.3d at 551.  But that 
monetary award, in contrast to the compensatory relief 
equating to actual damages awarded here, took the form of a 
remedial civil sanction, existing not merely to remedy “losses 
sustained due to noncompliance” but also to “coerce 
compliance” with the district court’s underlying injunction.  
Id. at 554 (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 735 (3d Cir. 1993)).  For that reason, 
the contempt order awarded an amount approximating John 
T.’s parents’ losses, but did not purport to reimburse their 
actual expenses.  See McDowell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 423 
F.3d 233, 240-41 (3d Cir. 2005); John T., 318 F.3d at 554. 
As we explained in John T., the contempt order’s close 
relationship with the underlying preliminary injunction alters 
the nature of the “prevailing party” analysis for such an order: 
a contempt order is considered “in . . . relation to the 
underlying relief that it enforces” and cannot confer 
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“prevailing party” status unless the underlying relief does.  
John T., 318 F.3d at 559-60.  Accordingly, when the 
underlying relief is forward-looking, injunctive, and 
temporary, the contempt order is too.  See id.  And the basic 
equivalence between a contempt order and the underlying 
relief it enforces extends not only to the “prevailing party” 
analysis, but also to whether the contempt order is appealable: 
because “a civil contempt proceeding is a continuation of the 
underlying civil action from which it arises,” in most cases 
the contempt order is not immediately appealable when the 
underlying action is not yet appealable.  3A Charles Alan 
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 703, 714 
(4th ed. 2017); see John T., 318 F.3d at 559; Halderman v. 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 
1982).  In John T., thus, the contempt order equated to a 
rewriting of the underlying forward-looking and temporary 
injunction in stronger terms, and hence it did not confer 
“prevailing party” status.  See John T., 318 F.3d at 559-60. 
What we have here is something wholly different.  
True, the reimbursement suit arose because of Ridley’s 
refusal to obey its obligations under the IDEA’s “stay put” 
provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), see Ridley IV, 744 F.3d at 
119.  But E.R.’s interim forward-looking right under 
§ 1415(j) to stay in private school was not at issue, and, in 
contrast to a contempt order that we must consider in relation 
to an underlying preliminary injunction, cf. John T., 318 F.3d 
at 559-60, or forward-looking and temporary injunctive relief, 
cf. John T., 318 F.3d at 558-59; J.O., 287 F.3d at 273-74, 
E.R.’s parents’ reimbursement award equated to  
backward-looking compensatory relief intended “to redress 
the concrete loss that the plaintiff[s] . . . suffered by reason of 
the defendant’s wrongful conduct,” State Farm Mut. Auto. 
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Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003).  The 
reimbursement award, in other words, had its own, 
independent merits and sought relief separate from any other 
relief that E.R.’s parents had sought from Ridley—
characteristics that confer “prevailing party” status. 
C. Other Circuits’ Cases 
The distinction we adopt today between  
forward-looking injunctive “stay put” relief and  
backward-looking compensatory “stay put” relief accords 
with the approaches taken by our Sister Circuits.  On the one 
hand, other Courts of Appeals addressing forward-looking 
injunctive orders have held that “stay put” injunctions and 
similar temporary orders relating to a child’s educational 
placement cannot confer “prevailing party” status, as we did 
in John T. and J.O.5  On the other hand, Courts of Appeals 
addressing reimbursement awards in the broader context of 
the IDEA have held generally that retrospective and 
compensatory relief confers “prevailing party” status,6 and 
                                              
5 See Tina M. ex rel. S.M. v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. 
Bd., 816 F.3d 57, 58-62 (5th Cir. 2016); Bd. of Educ. v. 
Nathan R. ex rel. Richard R., 199 F.3d 377, 382 (7th Cir. 
2000); Bd. of Educ. v. Steven L. ex rel. Andrew L., 89 F.3d 
464, 466-67, 469 (7th Cir. 1996); Christopher P. ex rel. 
Norma P. v. Marcus, 915 F.2d 794, 797-98, 804-05 (2d Cir. 
1990). 
6 See T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d 
469, 473, 479-80 (7th Cir. 2003); G ex rel. RG v. Fort Bragg 
Dependent Schs., 343 F.3d 295, 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2003); 
Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1433, 
1439-40 (10th Cir. 1997). 
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both appellate and district courts have ruled, specifically in 
the context of addressing backward-looking “stay put” relief 
(analogous to the reimbursement award here) or similar 
independent relief obtained under the IDEA, that such relief 
does confer “prevailing party” status, consistent with our 
conclusion today.7 
* * * 
For the reasons discussed above, we hold that the 
IDEA’s “stay put” provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), gives rise 
to two concomitant rights.  First, the provision establishes a 
physical right for a child with a disability to “stay put” in her 
                                              
7 See Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35 v. Mr. & Mrs. R., 
321 F.3d 9, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2003); A.D. ex rel. L.D. v. Dep’t of 
Educ., No. 12-0307, 2014 WL 692910, at *1, *3 (D. Haw. 
Feb. 20, 2014); Dep’t of Educ. v. C.B. ex rel. Donna B., 
No. 11-0576, 2013 WL 704934, at *2-3, *6-7 (D. Haw. Feb. 
26, 2013); Student X. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07-2316, 
2008 WL 4890440, at *27 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008); K.R. ex 
rel. M.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 66 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450-51 
(E.D.N.Y. 1999).  Citing to Termine ex rel. Termine v. 
William S. Hart Union High School District, Appellants point 
out that a Ninth Circuit panel held that a tuition 
reimbursement award “in a separate stay-put action” rendered 
the parents “prevailing parties.”  Appellants’ Br. 21 (citing 
Termine, 288 F. App’x 360, 362 (9th Cir. 2008)).  While we 
agree that the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit panel is 
persuasive, pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3(a), we cannot 
ascribe precedential value to Termine, which is an 
unpublished and non-precedential opinion.  See 9th Cir. 
R. 36-3. 
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“then-current educational placement,” which is a temporary 
right to forward-looking injunctive relief that does not 
determine the merits of any claim.  See Drinker, 78 F.3d at 
864.  Second, if a school district refuses to provide or pay for 
the child’s “then-current educational placement,” the “stay 
put” provision establishes the parents’ right to monetary 
reimbursement or, alternatively, the child’s right to 
compensatory education, both of which are rights to 
backward-looking compensatory relief and require an 
independent merits determination.  See Ridley IV, 744 F.3d at 
119; see also Lester H. ex rel. Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 
865, 872-73 (3d Cir. 1990). 
If the school district violates either right, then the 
parents can bring administrative or judicial action to enforce 
the violated right, and the parents’ eligibility for a fee award, 
if they are successful, depends on the underlying right 
enforced.  Where the action enforces the child’s physical right 
to “stay put” and the parents obtain temporary  
forward-looking injunctive relief, there is no determination 
“on the merits” and the parents are not eligible for a fee 
award.  See John T., 318 F.3d at 558-59.  But where the 
action enforces the parents’ right to reimbursement or the 
child’s right to compensatory education and the parents 
obtain backward-looking compensatory relief, the action 
requires an independent merits determination and the parents 
are eligible for a fee award.8 
                                              
8 In the course of oral argument, the issue was raised 
as to whether the “prevailing party” analysis is materially 
different for actions commenced at the administrative level 
and seeking backward-looking compensatory relief under the 
IDEA’s “stay put” provision.  For the avoidance of doubt, and 
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E.R.’s parents’ reimbursement litigation falls into the 
latter category: When Ridley refused to pay for E.R.’s “stay 
put” placement, E.R.’s parents sued for backward-looking 
compensatory relief, and, when they won the relief they 
sought, they obtained a merits-based victory.  See Ridley IV, 
744 F.3d at 117-28.  E.R.’s parents are therefore “prevailing 
part[ies]” under the IDEA and are eligible for an award of 
attorneys’ fees, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i), to be set by the 
District Court.9 
                                                                                                     
given that there is no exhaustion requirement for actions 
seeking relief under the IDEA’s “stay put” provision, see 
Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 
195, 199-200 (2d Cir. 2002), we hold that parents who obtain 
backward-looking compensatory relief are prevailing parties 
under the IDEA, whether they first pursue such relief in an 
administrative agency or in a court. 
9 In their application for attorneys’ fees and costs in 
the District Court, counsel for E.R.’s parents made a lengthy 
submission, including multiple declarations concerning the 
hours expended and the prevailing rates for attorneys of 
comparable experience.  While we leave it to the District 
Court on remand to consider the amount of E.R.’s parents’ 
fee award in the first instance, we note that the litigation here 
was conducted by highly qualified and experienced counsel 
and was itself extensive and protracted, with proceedings 
spanning from March 2011 to April 2016 and encompassing 
pleadings, motions, and briefing in the District Court; full 
briefing and argument in the Court of Appeals; and 
opposition to a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court. 
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IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse and remand 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
